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Representative Defendants 
NIREJ SEKHON* 
Everyone except the defendant in a criminal proceeding represents “the 
people.” Prosecutors, judges, and juries are all considered public 
agents. Defendants, in contrast, are thought of as parochial, interested 
in nothing more than saving their own skins. This broadly shared 
understanding of criminal court actors was not historically fated, nor 
is it legally accurate today. The Constitution tasks criminal defendants 
with significant public responsibility. They frequently represent the 
interests of third parties who have no direct stake in defendants’ 
criminal cases. Defendants vindicate the participatory rights of 
excluded jurors, they deter unconstitutional searches and seizures that 
could harm innocent civilians in the future, and they help ensure the 
transparent and expeditious functioning of the criminal justice system 
for the public’s benefit. Neither courts nor commentators recognize 
these representative actions as part of a coherent account of 
defendants’ role in the legal system. But representative defendants 
serve some of the same functions that representative plaintiffs do in the 
civil setting: overcoming information deficits, low-dollar-value harms, 
and resource scarcity, all of which make it unlikely that individual harm 
bearers will seek recourse in civil courts. Courts, commentators, and 
the public should be clear-eyed about the role defendants play in our 
legal system. Doing so would help modulate criminal justice policy and 
enable defense counsel to more effectively challenge the systemic, third-
party harms that criminal justice institutions generate.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In conventional thinking, everyone except the defendant in a criminal 
proceeding represents “the people.” Prosecutors bring criminal cases in the 
name of “the people.” The criminal law under which charges are brought is the 
people’s morality as codified by their representatives in the legislature. The 
judge is a public referee, steering the proceeding towards truth while minimizing 
inefficiency. And of course, the jury is the most literal representative of the 
people. The jury is selected from the people to apply its lay, common sense to 
the facts of a case. The only actor in the criminal court who sits alone, brooding 
and self-interested, is the defendant. 
The conventional view of defendants and criminal proceedings is incorrect. 
The Constitution tasks defendants with significant public responsibility. 
Defendants represent third-party interests when challenging unconstitutional 
police conduct, the discriminatory exclusion of prospective jurors, and 
violations of the speedy and public trial requirements. In most of these contexts, 
the Court has not given full-throated recognition to the defendant’s 
representative role, let alone developed a coherent account of it. This is due to 
the Court’s investment in the traditional view of criminal proceedings and 
attendant hostility to criminal defendants. But despite itself, the Court has 
embedded the idea of the defendant’s representative role in our constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
The Court has been clearest about the defendant’s representative role in the 
context of Batson challenges. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors 
based on impermissible criteria such as race.1 The Court has permitted 
defendants to challenge such exclusions even when the defendants do not 
themselves possess the identity trait that was the basis for excluding the juror.2 
For example, a white defendant may challenge the exclusion of black jurors.3 
Defendants vindicate the prospective jurors’ right to be free of discrimination.4  
In other constitutional contexts the Court has assigned defendants a 
representative role without being as forthright about having done so. For 
example, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule serves only one end: 
deterring future police misconduct.5 In a criminal proceeding, the only remedy 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 
 2 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). 
 3 This was the exact situation presented in Powers. Id. at 402–03. 
 4 See id. at 414. 
 5 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 246 (2011) (“Rather, we have said 
time and again that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law 
enforcement.”); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009) (“The exclusionary rule 
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available to defendants for an unconstitutional search or seizure is exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.6 The Court has stated that exclusion is not 
designed to compensate defendants for the constitutional harm they suffered.7 
Rather, its purpose is to deter future violations generally.8 This is to cast 
defendants as representative agents for third parties who might otherwise be 
subject to similar police mistreatment in the future.9  
The Court has understood the Sixth Amendment rights to speedy and public 
trial as protecting the public’s interests in an efficient and transparent criminal 
justice machinery.10 Members of the public, however, do not have standing to 
vindicate those interests, leaving it to defendants to perform that role on their 
behalf. 
The Court’s reluctance to acknowledge defendants’ representative role 
across these contexts owes to the Court’s insistence that the criminal process is 
singularly about determining guilt or innocence.11 While that one value explains 
                                                                                                                     
was crafted to curb police rather than judicial misconduct . . . .”); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 
U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“We have rejected indiscriminate application of the rule and have held 
it to be applicable only where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served—
that is, where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.”) (internal 
punctuation and citations omitted); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976) (“[A]lthough 
the [exclusionary] rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the 
nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well 
have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice.”); 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“The purpose of the exclusionary rule 
is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim . . . . Instead, the rule’s prime 
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of 
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”).  
 6 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the 
states). 
 7 See infra Part III.B. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement 
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 
267 (1988). 
 10 See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979) (recognizing “an 
independent public interest in the enforcement of Sixth Amendment guarantees”); Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972) (noting that “there is a societal interest in providing a 
speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the 
accused”). 
 11 See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule’s costly toll upon 
truth-seeking . . . presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.”) (quoting Pa. 
Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1998)); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
579 (1986) (“The thrust of the many constitutional rules governing the conduct of criminal 
trials is to ensure that those trials lead to fair and correct judgments.”); Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 488 (1976) (noting that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was not applied 
in Walder v. United States because it was outweighed by “the public interest in determination 
of truth at trial”) (characterizing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)); Tehan v. 
United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (declining to retroactively apply the 
Fifth Amendment prohibition on adverse comment to a defendant’s failure to testify because 
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why criminal proceedings have moral salience in our society, it cannot capture 
all the values at play in institutions as large and complex as our criminal justice 
systems. Among those values are ones encouraging civic participation, deterring 
police misconduct, and educating the public. Individual members of the public, 
however, have little ability or incentive to protect these values themselves. 
Drawing on the extensive literature about private attorneys general, this 
Article suggests that representative defendants solve many of the same problems 
that representative plaintiffs solve in the civil context.12 The procedural tools 
that private attorneys general avail themselves of—class actions, third-party 
standing, fee shifting, and qui tam provisions among others—are supposed to 
ensure optimal remediation of public harms in court.13 Information deficits, 
collective action problems, and litigation costs make it unattractive if not 
impossible for individual plaintiffs to vindicate harms that do not generate 
significant financial loss for any single individual.14 In theory, this is where 
institutional regulators should come into play. But such regulators, where they 
exist at all, may not be able to fulfill their regulatory mandate because of 
information deficits, lack of political will, and capture.15  
Analogous structural impediments prevent the public from vindicating its 
constitutional interests in being free from unreasonable searches and seizure, 
civic participation in the criminal process, learning about criminal proceedings, 
and the criminal justice system expeditiously processing wrongdoers. 
Representative defendants help ensure that these interests are adequately 
protected. 
Courts and commentators should more transparently and enthusiastically 
embrace the representative defendant. Just doing so as a rhetorical matter—
whether in the law school curriculum, judicial opinions, scholarship, or 
otherwise—may help shift opinions about criminal justice in a salutary 
direction. A public that views defendants as its (nonexclusive) representatives 
is less likely to reflexively support harsh criminal justice policy.16 If we are 
serious about defendants playing a representative role, then they and their 
counsel should also be provided the procedural and financial tools to do so 
effectively. That would entail a series of reforms that might include creating 
financial incentives for defense counsel to take up systemic challenges to 
criminal justice institutions, allowing for aggregation of constitutional claims in 
                                                                                                                     
such an application was unrelated to “[t]he basic purpose of a trial [which] is the 
determination of truth”).  
 12 See infra notes 223–27 and accompanying discussion. 
 13 See id. 
 14 See id. 
 15 See id. 
 16 Such reflexive support has, at least until recently, been the political norm in the 
United States for more than a generation. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: 
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 49 
(2003) (describing American harshness since the 1970s in comparison to contemporary 
Europe and American policy before 1970). 
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criminal courts, better judicial data collection, and more expansive disclosure 
requirements for criminal justice actors. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II offers a brief historical sketch of 
criminal court actors which suggests that today’s conventional wisdom about 
defendants was not fated. Nonetheless, most courts and commentators have 
come to take defendants’ parochialism as a fixed reality. Part III, the Article’s 
analytical heart, is a descriptive rejoinder to the conventional view. It details the 
various ways constitutional criminal procedure tasks defendants with 
representing third-party interests. Part IV argues that representative defendants 
are analogous to representative plaintiffs, at least when vindicating the kinds of 
public norms described in Part III. Relying on literature about representative 
plaintiffs in the civil context, Part IV concludes that it is normatively desirable 
for defendants to play a representative role and Part V identifies that 
conclusion’s implications. Part VI briefly concludes. 
II. THE PAROCHIAL DEFENDANT 
The conventional view takes the defendant as solitary and parochial, 
representing no one’s interests other than her own. This is in contrast to all the 
other actors in the courtroom, as described above. The parochial defendant is a 
holdover from nineteenth century criminal justice. Before then, prosecutors and 
judges, such as there were,17 were all parochial. Prosecutors and judges 
graduated into benighted public servants,18 leaving defendants behind. 
Prosecutors and courts grew more bureaucratic in the ostensible service of 
sorting guilty from innocent.19 Historians have not delved deeply into how the 
rise of public prosecutors and courts affected social conceptions of the criminal 
defendant. But existing historical accounts reveal the contingency and 
malleability of the roles played by criminal justice actors over time.20 This 
suggests that we should not take the defendant’s parochialism as a fixed fact, its 
deep traction in today’s conventional thinking notwithstanding.  
It was not until the mid- to late-nineteenth century that the idea of 
prosecutors and judges as truth-seeking, public servants developed. Before then, 
                                                                                                                     
 17 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27–
30, 62, 67 (1993) (describing early American criminal justice practice as local, informal, and 
dominated by lay advocates and judges). 
 18 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in 
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1316–23 (2002). 
 19 See Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal 
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 
570, 572–77 (1984) (describing the evolution of modern prosecutors and criminal courts). 
 20 See generally id. (describing the evolution of the role of aldermen, public 
prosecutors, police, and courts in criminal prosecution in the nineteenth century). 
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prosecutors,21 judges, and defendants were all parochially self-interested.22 
Throughout the nineteenth century and even into the twentieth century, criminal 
cases were an adjutant of private dispute resolution. There is no exhaustive 
account of these practices given that most proceedings were not formally 
recorded anywhere. Criminal justice was hyper-local and, to that extent, 
historical accounts of practices in particular places can be revealing, even if not 
comprehensively so. Allen Steinberg’s account of the rise of public prosecutors 
in nineteenth century Philadelphia is an example.23 
Steinberg described how early in American history, private individuals—
usually victims or their relations—prosecuted criminal cases themselves or 
through privately retained counsel.24 And “judges” were typically laypersons, 
often politically connected and paid piecemeal by complainants.25 These judges 
prodded most cases to settlement, leaving only a small portion to move on to 
grand jury review.26 This system (such as it was) served a rural society, a state 
with minimally developed bureaucratic capacity, and where crimes tended to 
involve a perpetrator and a victim. Those basic features were completely 
transformed by dramatic urbanization and accompanying social change 
beginning in the late nineteenth century.27 
The system of private prosecution gave way to our modern concepts of 
public prosecutors, police, and criminal courts in response to the changing needs 
of American cities. The vast inflow of immigrants, combined with pervasive 
worker unrest, created new social control exigencies for the middle and upper 
classes.28 The same structural shifts had occurred in other large industrial 
                                                                                                                     
 21 Before the birth of the modern public prosecutor, the word “prosecutor” was used to 
refer “to the person we would [now] understand to be the plaintiff.” Allen Steinberg, The 
“Lawman” in New York: William Travers Jerome and the Origins of the Modern District 
Attorney in Turn-of-the-Century New York, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 753, 754 (2003). 
 22 See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some 
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 293 (1989) (describing many players in the 
court system and their wide discretion to perform their respective roles); Ramsey, supra note 
18, at 1323–27 (providing a historical account of the players in the New York court system 
and their focus on serving their own respective interests). 
 23 See generally Steinberg, supra note 19, at 570–71 (formulating “an alternative 
history of criminal prosecution in America based on research on nineteenth-century 
Philadelphia”). 
 24 See id. at 571. 
 25 See id. at 571–73 (observing that city aldermen performed the role of judge and were 
paid by-the-case). 
 26 See id. at 573–74, 578–79, 583–84. 
 27 See id. at 584. 
 28 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 19–20 (“The settlers of the seventeenth century 
came at first in dribs and drabs, then in greater numbers; eventually, they overwhelmed the 
natives and their law.”); Steinberg, supra note 19, at 584; Samuel Walker, Governing the 
American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 
625 (“[T]he police served the will of the dominant political ideologies in a discriminatory 
manner.”). 
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cities,29 and the response was the same: to create a municipal police force to 
manage the lower classes and new arrivals.30 The police in turn began 
generating arrests for violations of criminal laws like public unrest, 
drunkenness, and vagrancy, which were inordinately committed by the lower 
classes.31 Because these offenses did not involve discrete victims, there was no 
one to bring private prosecutions nor would there have been a bureaucratically 
plausible way to process the volume of arrests generated by the newly created 
municipal police.32 Public prosecutors arose in response to these pressures.33 
The birth of the public prosecutor immediately raised the question of how 
effectively it represented the public. Historians have documented that caseload 
management practices like plea bargaining are coextensive with the rise of 
public prosecutors.34 And the practice appears to have been as unpopular with 
the public in the nineteenth century as it is today.35 The question of how to 
bridge the gulf between public preferences and prosecutors’ choices has long 
been a preoccupation for law scholars.36 They have imagined the central 
problem in terms of agency costs: how prosecutors (and criminal courts more 
generally) can be induced to resist bureaucratic incentives that favor quick, low-
visibility case disposal in favor of the public’s ostensible preference for more 
thorough and transparent vetting.37 The dilemma’s historical persistence 
suggests that there can be no final answer. But, for present purposes, the thing 
to notice is the question’s longstanding salience. 
No parallel question was (or is) typically asked about defendants. Accounts 
of modern criminal justice emphasize the growth and professionalization of 
                                                                                                                     
 29 See ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 35–37 (2017) (discussing Manchester, 
London, Boston, and New York City). 
 30 See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA 1860–1920, at 55 (2004). See 
generally Steinberg, supra note 21, at 754 (studying the history of law enforcement in New 
York City). 
 31 See Steinberg, supra note 19, at 572−73.  
 32 See id. at 579. 
 33 See id. at 582–83. 
 34 See Ramsey, supra note 18, at 1332–34, 1336–37 (discussing public criticism of 
prosecutors’ use of discretion in nineteenth century New York City); Steinberg, supra note 
19, at 585–86 (discussing the same criticism in Philadelphia). 
 35 See Ramsey, supra note 18, at 1336–37. 
 36 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 963 (2009) (analogizing to agency cost problems in 
the corporate context); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away 
Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 960–65 (1997) (noting the difficulty in 
ascertaining the public’s enforcement priorities); Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a 
Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 329 (2002) (“What . . . accounts for 
the traditional prosecutor’s tendency to maintain distance from the constituency she has been 
elected or appointed to represent?”). 
 37 See Bibas, supra note 36, at 961–63. 
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police,38 prosecutors,39 and the criminal courts.40 Little attention has been paid 
to what consequence these reforms had on the social conception of defendants 
and why there was no corresponding institutionalization of the criminal defense 
function. Sealing the criminal defendant off in an envelope of parochial 
otherness likely served important symbolic functions. The defendant’s 
selfishness and deviance perhaps underscored the rationality and integrity of 
prosecutors and courts, whose public charge was to sort guilty from innocent 
defendants.41  
It is likely that the parochial defendant was, at least in part, an ideological 
effect of the crime control bureaucracies that sprang up in the nineteenth 
century.42 Not only did those institutions require a “unitary field of objects” to 
act upon,43 but the media, and in turn the public, relied on those very institutions 
to generate information about defendants and criminals.44 They likely did so in 
ways that rationalized their own existence, emphasizing defendants’ deviant 
otherness. 
That the historical record has developed a fuller account of prosecutors and 
police than defendants almost certainly owes to the absence of institution-
building around criminal defense during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.45 Studying the rise of an institution is easier than studying its absence. 
But the advent of public defenders in the mid-twentieth century does not appear 
to have fundamentally shifted conceptions of the defendant’s parochialism. 
Neither scholars nor anyone else seems particularly bothered by questions of 
agency cost or transparency. Even among defenders themselves, ideals of 
                                                                                                                     
 38 See ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 11 (1977) (describing phases of reform 
of big-city police during the twentieth century). 
 39 See Ramsey, supra note 18, at 1316–23; Steinberg, supra note 19, at 570–71. 
 40 See MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE 
ERA CHICAGO xxviii–xxix (2003) (describing the modernization and centralizing 
Progressive Era reforms in Chicago courts). 
 41 This, at least, appears to be how reformists who supported professionalization of the 
police, prosecutors, and courts viewed things. See Jeffrey S. Adler, “It Is His First Offense. 
We Might as Well Let Him Go”: Homicide and Criminal Justice in Chicago, 1875−1920, 40 
J. SOC. HIST. 5, 10 (2006) (“According to a local crime-beat reporter, jurors often concluded 
that ‘both [the victim and the defendant] belong to the lowest of the low . . . .’”). 
 42 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 256 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (describing eighteenth and nineteenth 
century French penal practices on the creation of the criminal as the “delinquent”). 
 43 See id. 
 44 See DAVID RAY PAPKE, FRAMING THE CRIMINAL: CRIME, CULTURAL WORK AND THE 
LOSS OF CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1830–1900, at 33–53 (1987) (discussing the development of 
crime journalism in the mid-nineteenth century and its responsiveness to changing social 
hierarchies and configurations). 
 45 There was no constitutional obligation to fund indigent defense until 1963. See 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). Los Angeles created the first public 
defender’s office in 1913, and New York City followed suit four years later. See Kim Taylor-
Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public 
Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2424 (1996). 
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individualized representation echo notions of defendants’ parochialism at the 
expense of more collective and transformative notions of the defense function.46  
Framing criminal justice as a contest between a truth-seeking public agency 
and a solitary defendant has deep traction in scholarly literature. Take Herbert 
Packer’s iconic “crime control-due process” dualism model.47 He posited each 
model as an idealized account of criminal procedure. The former is fixated on 
“the repression of criminal conduct.”48 The latter values the creation of 
“impediments to carrying the accused” through the process because of concerns 
about the system’s accuracy, coerciveness, and inegalitarian bent.49 Scholars 
continue to embrace Packer’s gloss on constitutional criminal procedure.50 
Packer tells us that the crime control model favors the quick screening of 
suspects and defendants, relying heavily on the professional judgments of police 
and prosecutors.51 Crime control tolerates false positives, but only to the extent 
consistent with its underlying purpose of deterring crime.52 In contrast, the due 
process model posits criminal justice as a kind of obstacle course that seeks to 
sustain “the primacy of the individual and the complementary concept of 
limitation on official power.”53  
Packer invokes a familiar libertarian framing that pits the State’s aggregated 
power as a potential threat to individual freedom.54 It is because the defendant 
stands alone that there is moral imperative for law to protect her—at play here 
is a deeply intuitive idea about law’s role in leveling the field in favor of the 
weaker party to a contest. Packer suggests that, if unchecked, the State may use 
its coercive power against disfavored groups, if not everyone.55 This suggests 
the possibility that the due process model takes the defendant as a kind of “every 
person,” but the notion is left implicit and undeveloped in Packer’s account. 
Even progressive scholars preoccupied with the connection between 
defendants and communities have not explored the defendant’s role as public 
representative. For example, scholars of restorative justice are preoccupied with 
the relationship between defendants and community.56 But their concerns are 
socio-legal and therapeutic—they ask what dispute resolution, punishment, and 
                                                                                                                     
 46 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 45, at 2428–29 (describing the paradigm of 
individualized representation of defendants as the dominant model among public defenders). 
 47 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 153 (1968). 
 48 Id. at 158. 
 49 Id. at 163, 165–66, 168. 
 50 Perhaps not felicitously. See Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the 
Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 532 (1992). 
 51 PACKER, supra note 47, at 158–60. 
 52 See id. at 164–65. 
 53 Id. at 165. 
 54 Id. at 166 (“Power is always subject to abuse . . . . Precisely because of its potency 
in subjecting the individual to the coercive power of the state, the criminal process 
must . . . be subjected to controls . . . .”). 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of 
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 227–29. 
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reintegration practices facilitate community healing and minimizes defendants’ 
ostracism.57 Questions about constitutional criminal procedure are marginal if 
not irrelevant.58  
Jocelyn Simonson’s recent work on community participation in criminal 
justice practices sits provocatively between restorative justice discourse and 
constitutional criminal procedure.59 Her work takes the relationships between 
criminal defendants and communities as a starting point.60 She rightly critiques 
an abstracted notion of “the People” that both excludes poor, minority 
communities and casts prosecutors and police as broadly representative.61 She 
argues that criminal procedures should allow “communal resistance” and 
“popular interventions on behalf of defendants.”62 But she minimizes the 
practical significance of the defendant’s representative role.63  
The only effort at sketching the defendants’ representative role was a partial 
one by Daniel Meltzer in 1988.64 He saw it as less a frame for viewing 
defendants’ significance in our criminal justice system than as an ironic foil for 
expanding Article III and prudential standing principles to enable more civil 
litigation.65 He recognized that when defendants bring Fourth Amendment 
suppression motions or Fourteenth Amendment challenges to grand jury 
composition, they act in a representative capacity.66 But he offered this in the 
way of critiquing the Supreme Court’s cases limiting civil plaintiffs from 
challenging the government policy on third-party standing principles.67 If the 
Court is willing to let criminal defendants represent third-party interest, he 
argued, surely it made sense to let upstanding plaintiffs do the same.68 
Missing from legal scholarship is an account that identifies the full scope of 
the defendant’s representative role, the justifications for that role, and for 
enabling it more fully. The rest of this Article develops that account. 
                                                                                                                     
 57 See id. 
 58 That is reason for skepticism about restorative justice practices. See Richard 
Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 751, 760–61 (2000) (critiquing restorative justice processes that require early 
waiver of constitutional rights). 
 59 See Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 252–53 (2019).  
 60 See id. at 286–88. 
 61 See id. at 271–73, 279–82.  
 62 See id. at 256–57, 299–303. 
 63 See id. at 275–76 (“[W]hile [a] strand of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does 
indeed imply that defendants are part of a broader ‘people,’ . . . the context of adjudicatory 
procedure does not support the inverse idea, that the ‘people’ support the defendant.”). 
 64 Meltzer, supra note 9, at 298. 
 65 See id. at 295–300. 
 66 See id. at 298. 
 67 See id. at 327–28. 
 68 See id. 
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III. CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AND THIRD-PARTY INTERESTS 
Constitutional criminal procedure tasks defendants with representing the 
interests of third parties, although that role is not as clearly defined as it is in the 
civil context. In civil cases, plaintiffs perform a representative function as class 
representatives under the rules of civil procedure or when authorized to sue as 
private attorneys general.69 
Criminal defendants represent the interests of excluded jurors, future 
victims of police misconduct, and the public more generally. The Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments empower defendants to challenge the discriminatory 
exclusion of jurors and to protect the participatory rights of minority 
communities to serve as prospective jurors. The Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule casts defendants as representative of citizens who may be 
future victims of police misconduct. Constitutional criminal procedure also 
relies on defendants to protect the transparency and integrity of the criminal 
justice system on behalf the public in a more general way. The Sixth 
Amendment rights to speedy and public trial are examples. 
In none of these contexts has the Court formally assigned criminal 
defendants the duty to represent the interests of unnamed third parties. Rather, 
the Court has tethered defendants’ self-interest in avoiding conviction to public-
regarding functions. The Court has typically done so equivocally, avoiding clear 
articulation of defendants’ representative role in vindicating constitutional 
norms. The ambivalence owes to the Court’s investment in the parochial 
conception of defendants,70 and relatedly, the view that the criminal process is 
singularly devoted to ascertaining defendants’ guilt or innocence.71 That view 
is belied by the complexity and scale of our criminal justice systems which 
necessarily implicate a range of constitutional values beyond ascertaining guilt 
or innocence. Often enough, it is defendants who are called upon to protect that 
broad, but underrecognized range of values on behalf of themselves and others. 
A. Vindicating Jurors’ Participatory Rights 
The Supreme Court has been clearest about defendants’ representative role 
in Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the discriminatory exclusion of petit 
jurors. That role extends to fair cross-section challenges under the Sixth 
Amendment, although the Court has been more elliptical about the defendant’s 
representative role in that context. In neither context is the defendant required 
                                                                                                                     
 69 See infra Part IV.A. 
 70 The sentiment is exemplified by Cardozo’s famous quip about the 
“constable[’s] . . . blunder[],” in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926), that is 
often held out as underscoring the costs of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. See 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 614 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (invoking Cardozo). 
 71 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
579 (1986); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 
382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). 
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to possess the identity trait that was the alleged basis for excluding prospective 
jurors. Defendants’ representative role underscores how the constitutional 
harms associated with juror exclusion often have little to do with defendants’ 
selfish interests in selecting jurors inclined to acquit. Rather, it is that such 
discrimination degrades minorities’ civic status and erodes the public’s 
perception that criminal courts fairly administer justice.72 
In Powers v. Ohio, the Court decided that a white criminal defendant has 
standing to challenge a prosecutor’s discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges against prospective black jurors.73 This extended Batson v. Kentucky, 
where the Court read the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid racial discrimination 
in the use of peremptory challenges.74 Peremptory challenges allow both sides 
to strike jurors for any reason; this seems to not just allow, but encourage, strikes 
based on racial and other stereotypes.75 Unwilling to do away with peremptory 
challenges altogether,76 the Court required that trial court judges screen 
prosecutors’ motivations for bias only where the defense makes a prima facie 
showing of race-based peremptory strikes.77  
The Batson Court noted how race-based peremptory strikes deny would-be 
jurors’ rights to civic participation,78 suggesting an analogy to voting.79 A big 
part of the reason for enshrining the right to jury trial in the Constitution was to 
ensure ordinary citizens’ opportunity to participate in the administration of 
justice.80 Excluding jurors on the basis of race not only robs minority citizens 
of this opportunity to participate in civic life, but stigmatizes them based on 
race.81 Race-based exclusion reproduces the notion that racial minorities cannot 
be trusted to perform their civic duty.82 
When a defendant and prospective jurors share the relevant identity trait, 
like in Batson where both were black, there is shared stigmatic harm. The racial 
meaning produced by the juror’s exclusion inures to the disadvantage of both 
juror and defendant.83 Permitting criminal defendants to vindicate that harm 
                                                                                                                     
 72 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 
 73 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). 
 74 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. 
 75 See id. at 102–05 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 76 See id. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) (contending that peremptory challenges 
ought to be eliminated). 
 77 See id. at 96–98. 
 78 See id. at 87. 
 79 See Jenny Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 848 (2015); Barbara 
D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 746–47 (1992). 
 80 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91. 
 81 See id. at 122 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 
554 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
 82 See id. at 104–05 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 83 Id. at 86 (“Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a 
defendant’s right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury 
is intended to secure.”). 
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prevents racial stigmatization affecting both individuals. The shared identity 
trait satisfies the standing doctrine requirement that the representative have 
suffered an injury that bears close relation to that suffered by the third party.84 
But what about when the defendant and the juror do not share the same identity 
trait? Then, it would seem the defendant is acting more like a whistleblower 
with little at stake in the challenged conduct.85 
In Powers, the Court recognized the defendants’ representative role, but 
refused to cast them as whistleblowers. Instead, the Court insisted that racial 
discrimination against prospective minority jurors inflicts personal harm on 
white defendants.86 Diminution in the likelihood of a not-guilty verdict does not 
constitute a cognizable constitutional harm. Rather, the Court explained that the 
harm lies in the defendants’ loss of “confidence in the court and its verdict” 
when excluded jurors’ objections cannot be heard.87 The Court also suggested 
that white defendants’ injury is no different than black defendants,’ revising its 
account in Batson.  
In Powers, the Court stated that defendants’ race is just a matter of fact 
“relevant to discerning bias in some cases,” but nothing more.88 The passing 
analysis lacks conviction and rings false.89 White defendants’ “injury,” if it can 
even be called that, would hardly suffice for standing in other contexts.90 This 
gets at what appears to be an even deeper disconnect between defendants’ 
motivations in any particular case and the harm that juror discrimination 
generates.  
Defendants’ motivations for challenging juror discrimination is the hope 
that the excluded juror(s) would be more inclined to find the defendant “not 
guilty.” But there can be no right to that result, only to a process that fairly 
allows for the possibility of such a result.91 This structural reality sits 
                                                                                                                     
 84 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991). 
 85 See infra Part IV.A. 
 86 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 411. 
 87 The defendant’s injury is explained unartfully: “The rejected juror may lose 
confidence in the court and its verdicts, as may the defendant if his or her objections cannot 
be heard.” Id. at 414. It is unclear whether the pronouns “his or her” refer to the defendant 
or the juror. If they refer to the “defendant,” as ordinary grammar seems to require, then it 
just begs the very question at the heart of the litigation: Why should the defendant get to 
object at all? The quote is clearer if “his or her” refers to the “juror.” The idea then would 
appear to be that the juror’s inability to object tears the civic fabric in a way that offends both 
the excluded juror and the defendant.  
 88 Id. at 416. Compare id., with Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted) (“The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not 
exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race . . . or on the false 
assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors . . . .”). 
 89 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 414 (“[T]here can be no doubt that [the defendant] will be a 
motivated, effective advocate for the excluded venirepersons’ rights. . . . [Because] 
discrimination in the jury selection process may lead to the reversal of a conviction.”). 
 90 See id. at 426–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 91 The nature of the harm—exclusion from participating in a civic process—suggests 
an analogy between jurors and voters. See Underwood, supra note 79, at 746–47. 
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uncomfortably with the formalistic, anti-discrimination norms that animate 
equal protection and fair cross-section jurisprudence.92 The Court has reasoned 
that what makes racial and gender discrimination wrong is that the excluded 
jurors are no less able to impartially decide cases than white or male jurors.93 
But if true that minority and women jurors behave similarly to their white male 
peers, then why should a defendant have the right to be judged by the former?94 
If the Court were to recognize that minority and women jurors view defendants 
more favorably, it would justify prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges to 
strike them.95 This contradiction is soluble if one takes defendants as 
representative actors who receive the possibility of a more favorable trial result 
as a bounty for having vindicated the excluded jurors’ interests.96  
A parallel contradiction underlying discrimination claims involving grand 
jurors is similarly resolved by recognizing the defendant’s representative role, 
as Daniel Meltzer recognized.97 Equal protection prohibits the intentionally 
discriminatory exclusion of minorities and women from grand juries.98 
Generally, procedural defects in grand jury proceedings are cured by conviction; 
conviction demonstrates the propriety of having indicted the defendant in the 
first place.99 Not so where the State has discriminatorily excluded jurors.100 
Courts are to vacate convictions that are based on indictments handed down by 
grand juries constituted through the purposeful exclusion of women or minority 
jurors.101 A convicted defendant’s challenge is thus best understood, as Daniel 
Meltzer proposed a generation ago, as a representative one. The defendant seeks 
to vindicate the excluded jurors’ participatory rights; the vacated conviction is 
just an incentive to litigate, not a remedy for the harm suffered.102 
                                                                                                                     
 92 Commentators have characterized the Court’s commitment to colorblind, race 
jurisprudence as formalistic. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 10 LA RAZA 
L.J. 561, 584 (1998) (“The [color-blindness] canon severs legal doctrine from its racial and 
political foundation. Thus severed, doctrine occupies a formalist position of color-blind 
impartiality. From this culturally detached position, racial hierarchies appear imperceptible 
and subordinate narratives unfold naturally.”); Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race Theory: New 
Strategies for Civil Rights in the New Millennium?, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 23 
(2002) (“In the eyes of formalist justices, any attention to race was improper and illegal; the 
law was supposed to be color-blind.”).  
 93 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87; Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless 
Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 101–02 (1996). 
 94 See Muller, supra note 93, at 101–03. 
 95 Earlier Supreme Court cases recognized that race might play a role in predicting 
outcomes. See id. at 98–100. 
 96 See id. at 100–01. 
 97 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 259–60, 298; see also Underwood, supra note 79, at 
739.  
 98 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977).  
 99 See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73 (1986). 
 100 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261–62 (1986). 
 101 See id. 
 102 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 259–60, 298. 
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Sixth Amendment fair cross-section claims also presuppose that defendants 
play a representative role. Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth 
Amendment expressly creates a right to an impartial jury.103 Where excluded 
jurors themselves may bring an Equal Protection Clause challenge in their own 
name, they cannot bring a Sixth Amendment challenge. While the Amendment 
confers a right on the defendant, its scope and purpose are unclear unless one 
understands defendants’ role as representative.104 
Defendants’ right only extends as far as the venire—the petit jury must be 
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community,105 but the petit jury itself 
need not reflect a fair cross-section.106 If fair cross-section is central to a jury 
being impartial, then why must a petit jury not itself reflect a fair cross-section 
of the community?107 If excluding the unique perspective of minorities and 
women from the venire creates the harm of a potentially partial jury, then why 
does the same not hold true for petit juries?108 If, on the other hand, it is 
wrongful to exclude minorities and women because they are no different from 
white men, what harm befalls defendants from excluding these prospective 
jurors?109 As with Batson challenges, the Court has understood the Sixth 
Amendment not to require that defendants belong to the group excluded from 
the jury venire as a prerequisite for challenging the exclusion.110 An account 
rooted in shared stigmatic harm is as inadequate in the Sixth Amendment 
context as it was in the Batson context.  
These questions are answered if, like with Batson claims, one conceives of 
prospective jurors’ having a stake in Sixth Amendment fair cross-sections cases. 
And in this regard, juror participation rights are analogous to voting rights. Just 
like the right to vote does not entail the right to pick the winning candidate, one 
only has the right to a fair opportunity to serve on an actual jury, not the right to 
                                                                                                                     
 103 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975). The Court has understood this to 
require a jury that represents a fair cross-section of the community from which it is drawn. 
Id. at 537–38. 
 104 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 370 (1979); Taylor, 419 U.S. at. 535–38. 
 105 See supra notes 93–102 and accompanying discussion. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See Duren, 439 U.S. at 371 n.* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s 
fair cross-section analysis was “internally inconsistent”). 
 108 See id. at 373 n* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“If impartiality is not lost because a 
particular class or group represented in the community is unrepresented on the petit jury, it 
is certainly not lost because the class or group is underrepresented on the jury venire.”). 
 109 See id. (arguing that the majority’s fair cross-section analysis was more concerned 
with vindicating excluded jurors’ equal protection rights than the defendant’s right to an 
impartial jury). This paradox is homologous to that raised by Eric Muller in the Batson 
context. Muller, supra note 93, at 96 (raising the question of whether the Batson framework 
is workable given the Justices’ views on the predictive power of race and gender). 
 110 In Taylor v. Louisiana and Duren v. Missouri, for example, the Court permitted male 
defendants to challenge the exclusion of women from the venire. Duren, 439 U.S. at 360–
63; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 524–25 (1975). 
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be on any particular jury.111 Requiring that members of protected groups be 
fairly included in venires creates the possibility that they will be included in 
petit juries, but does not guarantee that any given petit jury will represent a fair 
cross-section of the community. That defendants are charged with vindicating 
this interest makes sense here in the same way that it does in Batson.  
The Court has cited excluded jurors’ civic participation rights to justify its 
Sixth Amendment cross-section holdings.112 It has also invoked its Equal 
Protection jurisprudence in Sixth Amendment cases suggesting that the two 
sources together ensure that jurors are not subject to discrimination throughout 
the processes of selecting grand and petit juries.113 All of this indicates that both 
provisions protect overlapping participation interests that belong to excluded 
jurors. This, in turn, casts the defendant as a representative actor. 
B. Representing Potential Victims of Police Misconduct 
The modern exclusionary rule is best understood as a representative device 
that allows defendants to forestall future constitutional violations against 
innocent third-party civilians. The vast majority of Fourth Amendment claims 
are litigated in criminal courts for the remedy of exclusion—the suppression of 
evidence obtained as a result of the Fourth Amendment violation.114 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that exclusion’s sole purpose is to deter 
police officers from violating the Fourth Amendment in the future, not to 
compensate the criminal defendants’ constitutional injury.115 Rather, exclusion 
creates an incentive to litigate the constitutional issue.116 Exclusion’s ultimate 
beneficiaries are thus the unnamed members of the community who might 
otherwise be subject to the same unconstitutional police tactics in the future.  
                                                                                                                     
 111 See Underwood, supra note 79, at 746 (noting that “the Equal Protection Clause 
applies with special force” to the criteria for jury service eligibility). 
 112 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530–31 (emphasizing that the fair cross-section requirement 
ensures community participation in the criminal justice system). 
 113 See Duren, 439 U.S. at 365 n.24 (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 627 
(1972)). 
 114 See Kenneth W. Starr & Audrey L. Maness, Reasonable Remedies and (or?) the 
Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 373, 375 (2010) (“A quick look at most courts’ 
dockets each year leaves no doubt that the [exclusionary] rule spawns much litigation.”). 
 115 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 299, 231–32 (2011) (noting that the 
exclusionary rule is “a deterrent sanction” seeking to prevent “police misconduct”); United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule’s prime purpose is 
to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”). 
 116 The Court has not explicitly spelled this out, but it is the clear implication of its 
characterization of exclusion as a “windfall” for the defendant designed to deter future police 
misconduct. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 248 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976)). 
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The Court does insist that the defendant have personally sustained Fourth 
Amendment injury as a precondition to obtaining exclusion.117 This is to avoid 
a completely gratuitous reward for the defendant.118 There is no formal 
requirement that the defendant’s injuries be typical of those sustained by 
others.119 The Court has however recently suggested that exclusion may be 
particularly appropriate where a defendant’s Fourth Amendment injury is the 
product of systemic police misconduct and thus impacts a multitude.120 
Even though not its original understanding,121 the modern Court has come 
to view the exclusionary rule as serving deterrence alone. In United States v. 
Calandra, the Court stated that “[t]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to 
redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim . . . [but rather] ‘to deter—
to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty’” in the future.122 The Court 
has repeated this account of the exclusionary remedy in case after case.123 The 
Court has never precisely explained the mechanism by which the deterrent effect 
should operate.124 Presumably it is through expressive or pedagogical means.125 
By this theory, exclusion flags the officer’s error for the prosecutor, other 
officers, and police administrators.126 Once apprised of the constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
 117 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (“[I]t is proper to permit only defendants 
whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the [exclusionary] rule’s 
protections.”). 
 118 See id. at 139 (noting that the standing inquiry only requires the proponent to 
factually allege an injury from which they individually have a legal right to relief). 
 119 See id. 
 120 See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (emphasizing that there was “no 
indication that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct”). 
 121 Exclusion was originally conceived as a constitutional analogue for the traditional, 
common law remedy of restitution. See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the 
Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
555, 591–92 (1996) (“The Court emphasized the central role played by property law concepts 
in Fourth Amendment analysis . . . .”). The analogy made sense given property rights’ 
centrality to early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For example, in Boyd v. United States, 
an early and canonical Fourth Amendment case, the Supreme Court simply assumed that the 
Fourth Amendment required exclusion as a kind of disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. 116 
U.S. 616, 638 (1886).  
 122 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).  
 123 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (discussing the Court’s consistent 
view that the exclusionary rule requires deterrence benefits to outweigh the social costs of 
exclusion). 
 124 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94 (1976) (stating that the exclusionary rule 
should be implemented at trial and enforced on direct appeal). 
 125 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 267 (noting that the exclusionary rule deters illegal 
searches by removing the incentive conduct them). 
 126 See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 
881, 910 (1991) (noting that the exclusionary rule forces officers to give back the gains from 
their misconduct). 
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violation and its consequence, rational police officers will avoid committing the 
same violation in future interactions with civilians.127 
Not just any defendant can obtain exclusion for a Fourth Amendment 
violation that produced evidence against them. The Court requires that a 
defendant have sustained actual injury in order to seek suppression.128 In 
creating this “standing” rule,129 the Court noted that conceiving of deterrence 
too broadly would dangerously “enlarg[e] the class of persons who may invoke” 
the exclusionary rule.130 The chief criticism of the exclusionary remedy has 
been that it confers a windfall upon guilty defendants.131 Permitting defendants 
who have sustained no personal injury to vindicate others’ Fourth Amendment 
harm was too great a windfall for the Court to countenance.132 
The structure of Fourth Amendment exclusion makes the defendant a kind 
of anemic class representative.133 Anemic because there is neither a mechanism 
for criminal courts to evaluate whether defendants’ injuries actually track those 
sustained by others nor can criminal courts enjoin the police from engaging in 
the same constitutional misconduct in the future.134 Also unlike a class 
representative, there is no legal obligation for a defendant to behave in the 
interests of future victims.135 Many defendants will bargain away a prospective 
Fourth Amendment claim in the interests of obtaining a more favorable plea 
deal from the prosecutor.136 
Ironically, the Court has laid the rhetorical basis for the defendant’s 
representative role in opinions denying exclusion to defendants who have 
                                                                                                                     
 127 Although there is good empirical reason to question this theory. See Jon B. Gould & 
Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior under the U.S. 
Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 316 (2004) (reporting that about one-third 
of observed police searches were unconstitutional, none of which were reported to a court).  
 128 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). 
 129 The Court initially resisted characterization of the injury requirement as a “standing” 
requirement. See id. at 138 (“[T]he question necessarily arises whether it serves any useful 
analytical purpose to consider this principle a matter of standing . . . .]”). 
 130 Id. 
 131 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 248 (2011) (“Such a result would 
undoubtedly be a windfall to this one random litigant.”); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 
(1976) (“The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer 
and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the idea 
of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice.”). 
 132 It also undercuts claims of “typicality” and “commonality” which define a class 
representative’s role. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 133 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 267 (suggesting that general deterrence from exclusion 
turns criminal defendants into private attorneys general). 
 134 See id. at 293–94 (discussing the challenge of crafting a deterrent remedy, given the 
lack of mechanisms for judicial control). 
 135 See id. at 303 (noting that criminal defendants seeking exclusion are motivated by a 
personalized, individual benefit, rather than pursuing societal interests). 
 136 See infra notes 253–62 and accompanying discussion. 
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suffered Fourth Amendment harm.137 These cases emphasize that deterrence is 
the only justification for the exclusionary rule and then go on to conclude that 
granting suppression would not produce any deterrent effect.138 In at least some 
of these cases, the Court seems to deploy the rationale just to avoid rewarding a 
defendant that it views as particularly unworthy. For example, in Stone v. 
Powell, the Court thought it unlikely that the prospect of exclusion in a habeas 
proceeding, years after an arrest, would have any impact on police officers.139 
It is not clear why it would be any less likely to reach the ears of police officers 
than after a reversal after a particularly lengthy direct appeal or even trial.140 
More likely, the Court simply thought it unsavory that a defendant convicted of 
a serious crime should receive the benefit of exclusion.  
In more recent cases, the Court has hinted that exclusion is inappropriate 
where the third-party beneficiaries are likely to be criminals rather than innocent 
civilians. For example, in Pennsylvania v. Scott, the Court held that exclusion is 
not available in parole revocation proceedings.141 In Hudson v. Michigan, the 
Court refused to provide an exclusionary remedy for the police’s 
unconstitutional failure to heed the “knock-and-announce rule” prior to forcibly 
entering Hudson’s home pursuant to a search warrant.142 Hudson involved 
execution of a validly obtained search warrant for narcotics and drugs.143 The 
                                                                                                                     
 137 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 299, 240 (2011) (“Police practices trigger 
the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield ‘meaningfu[l]’ 
deterrence, and culpable enough to be ‘worth the price paid by the justice system.’”); Herring 
v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139, 144, 147–48 (2008) (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, 
police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and 
sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”); 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590 (2006) (discussing the knock-and-announce rule and 
the police officer as the focus of analysis); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976) 
(discussing the “pragmatic” approach of the exclusion precedents, “that the interests 
safeguarded by the exclusionary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to prevent 
perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial process”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 342 n.2 (1974) (noting the search of defendant’s business and seizure of his property 
was lawful). 
 138 See, e.g., Davis, 564 U.S. at 241 (“Responsible law enforcement officers will take 
care to learn ‘what is required of them’ under Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform 
their conduct to these rules.”); Herring, 555 U.S. at 139–40 (“We have stated that this 
judicially created rule is ‘designed to safeguard rights generally through its deterrent 
effect.’”); Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596 (noting a concern that “without suppression there will be 
no deterrence of knock-and-announce violations at all”); Stone, 428 U.S. at 493 (questioning 
the assumptions underpinning the deterrence rationale); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351 
(discussing the efficacy of deterrence during grand jury proceedings versus trials). 
 139 Stone, 428 U.S. at 493–94. 
 140 Id. at 493.  
 141 Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998) (citation omitted) 
(“The costs of allowing a parolee to avoid the consequences of his violation are compounded 
by the fact that parolees (particularly those who have already committed parole violations) 
are more likely to commit future criminal offenses than are average citizens.”). 
 142 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594. 
 143 Id. at 588. 
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case involved only the method used to enter a home that held criminal evidence 
inside.144 
The Court has denied exclusion in cases where searches followed 
unconstitutional arrests based on false database entries showing active arrest 
warrants for the defendants.145 In Herring and Evans, unconstitutional stops 
based on quashed warrants (that the officers mistakenly thought valid at the time 
of the stop) yielded evidence of new criminal misconduct.146 In allowing 
prosecutors to use the unlawfully seized evidence, the Court treated these cases 
as isolated instances of mistaken data entry.147 This in turn suggested that 
suppressing evidence would yield little deterrence.148 In Herring, the Court 
noted that things would be different if evidence suggested that “systemic errors” 
in the warrants database made it unreliable and thus reckless to rely on it.149 An 
unreliable database would be one that failed to distinguish between wanted and 
innocent persons, leaving the latter subject to regular stops and searches. 
Herring’s implication is that a defendant acting for the benefit of these unnamed 
civilians should be entitled to suppression.150  
Most recently, in Utah v. Strieff, the Court held that evidence discovered 
incident to arrest following an unconstitutional stop need not be suppressed if 
the officer discovers an outstanding bench warrant for the defendant during the 
stop.151 The valid bench warrant is an “intervening circumstance” that interrupts 
the causal chain linking the constitutional violation to the incriminating 
evidence.152 In the absence of such causal connection, exclusion is 
unnecessary.153 The holding was based in part on the empirical assumption that 
police officers do not regularly make unconstitutional stops in order to check 
                                                                                                                     
 144 Id. 
 145 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 
U.S. 1, 4 (1995).  
 146 Herring, 555 U.S. at 136–37; Evans, 514 U.S. at 4. 
 147 Herring, 555 U.S. at 147–48; Evans, 514 U.S. at 15–16.  
 148 See Herring, 555 U.S. at 147. The point here about defendant’s non-
representativeness is inferential. In the opinion, the Court focused on the question of whether 
police clerks could be deterred from behaving negligently. See id. Some commentators have 
worried that cases like Herring foretell exclusion’s demise in all search and seizure cases. 
See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should It Be?, 
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 343, 343 n.23 (2013) (noting this concern and citing scholarship 
to that effect). 
 149 Herring, 555 U.S. at 146 (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. at 17) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 150 Evans, 514 U.S. at 17 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that it would be 
unreasonable for the police to rely on a warrant system that “routinely leads to false arrests”) 
(emphasis added). 
 151 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 2061 (noting that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search is 
admissible if the connection between the search and the evidence is disrupted by an 
intervening circumstance). 
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for outstanding warrants.154 The Court, however, echoed the language in 
Herring, stating that the result might have been different if the “stop was part of 
[some] systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”155 Of course, unlike in 
Herring, the warrant in Strieff was valid.156 But it was for a traffic offense; 
existing data suggests that these are the most typical kinds of outstanding 
warrants.157 Given how minor the infraction was, the distinction between 
“wanted” and “innocent” individuals should perhaps not be so terribly 
significant.  
Given the defendant’s representative role, exclusion would seem most 
urgent in cases where the police violation is representative of widespread and 
systemic practices indiscriminately impacting the guilty and innocent alike. It is 
in such cases where a defendant’s experience would seem most representative 
and where the need for deterrence is greatest. Amici in Strieff presented such 
evidence, but it was based on characteristically spotty data and the Court paid it 
little heed.158 Criminal defendants will often have difficulty fulfilling the 
representative role they are tasked with playing because individual criminal 
litigation offers only limited opportunities to collect evidence that reveals 
systemic misconduct in comparison to civil litigation.159 This suggests that the 
exclusionary rule’s deterrent function cannot be fully realized without 
procedural innovations in criminal courts.160 
C. Guaranteeing Criminal Justice’s Transparency and Efficacy 
The Sixth Amendment enumerates what is required of “criminal 
prosecutions,” including that trials be “speedy and public.”161 The Court has 
                                                                                                                     
 154 See id. at 2063 (stating that the stop at issue was an “isolated instance of negligence”). 
The assumption was fiercely contested by the dissenters. See id. at 2068–69 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (characterizing many unconstitutional stops as the product of “institutionalized 
training procedures”); id. at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that outstanding warrants 
are the “run-of-the-mill results of police stops”). 
 155 Id. at 2058. 
 156 Id. at 2062 (“[B]ecause we ultimately conclude that the warrant breaks the causal 
chain, we also have no need to decide whether the warrant’s existence alone would make the 
initial stop constitutional even if [the officer] was unaware of its existence.”). 
 157 See Nirej Sekhon, Dangerous Warrants, 93 WASH. L. REV. 967, 987–92 (2018) 
(“National and state databases contain records of nearly eight million outstanding warrants, 
more than half of which are for minor crimes, traffic-related offenses, and violations of civil 
orders like child support obligations.”). 
 158 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2073 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the significant 
number of outstanding warrants in California, Pennsylvania, and New York City). 
 159 David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: 
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 
713–14 (2006) (noting that criminal discovery relies on each party performing their own 
investigations, rather than the more mutual civil discovery process). 
 160 See infra Part IV.B.  
 161 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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stated that these are “rights” that belong to individual defendants.162 But this 
characterization is at odds with the Court’s recognition that they are also process 
values in which the public has an interest separate from,163 and sometimes even 
antagonistic to defendants’ interests.164 This tension is eased by conceptualizing 
the defendant as a representative actor. 
1. Public Trial 
The Constitution empowers both criminal defendants and the media to 
vindicate third-parties’ interests in public trials under the Sixth and First 
Amendments respectively. The Court has read the two Amendments to protect 
substantially overlapping interests, citing opinions interpreting one amendment 
in cases implicating the other and vice versa.165 Public trial describes a process 
value that inures to the benefit of the public.166 Sometimes, defendants’ interests 
align with the public’s interest. But when they do not, defendants’ rights to 
waiver are curtailed, preventing them from defeating the public’s interests. This 
underscores the extent to which third-party interests underwrite the Sixth 
Amendment public trial right.  
The Court has insisted that “public trial,” like all other Sixth Amendment 
rights, “is personal to the accused.”167 This characterization is born out in cases 
where secrecy is in the service of judicial vindictiveness or caprice. For 
example, in In re Oliver, the Court found a Sixth Amendment violation where a 
state court judge summarily sentenced Oliver to jail for contempt following a 
secret trial.168 Citing the Spanish Inquisition and Star Chamber as examples, the 
Court noted that secrecy allows courts to become “instruments of 
persecution.”169 “[C]ontemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion” 
serves as a check, ensuring fair outcomes for defendants.170  
                                                                                                                     
 162 See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1979). 
 163 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (“[H]ow we 
allocate the ‘right’ to openness [at trial] as between the accused and the public, or whether 
we view it as a component inherent in the system benefiting both, is not crucial.”). 
 164 David Sklansky has recognized the extent to which many criminal procedure rights 
do not fit the mold of traditional negative rights. See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative 
Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1244 (2002) (arguing 
that many criminal procedure rights require “the government to do something affirmative”). 
He notes that quasi-affirmative rights often have “systemic implications” that courts often 
try to avoid. Id. 
 165 See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44–45 (1984) (discussing First Amendment 
precedents in a Sixth Amendment decision). 
 166 See Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 508. 
 167 Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 379–80. 
 168 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 258–59 (1948) (trial was conducted off the record in a 
location not precisely clear without transcription). 
 169 Id. at 269–70. 
 170 Id. at 270. 
2020] REPRESENTATIVE DEFENDANTS 41 
In cases less extreme than Oliver, public trial’s benefit for defendants and 
third parties are more symmetrical. A defendant may want the presence and 
support of family, friends, and other members of her community in court.171 
This will not necessarily have any discernible bearing on the outcome in a 
specific case but may make the process more dignified and humane for 
defendants. Generally, defendants’ supporters will have their own interests in 
the courtroom being open.172 But the Court has held that they do not have 
constitutional standing to compel open court.173 Defendants must represent 
these third-party interests. But defendants do more than just that. 
Defendants who bring public trial challenges vindicate the public’s interest 
in promoting criminal justice systems’ transparency, integrity, and pedagogic 
benefits. The Court has noted that requiring open courts “ensure[s that] judge[s] 
and prosecutor[s] carry out their duties responsibly.”174 In extending the public 
trial right to suppression hearings, the Court noted the public’s “strong interest 
in exposing substantial allegations of police misconduct.”175 Witnesses are also 
more likely to come forward and testify truthfully if subject to the public’s 
gaze.176 All of these public interests speak to criminal justice’s pedagogic 
function. Access to criminal justice proceedings allows the public to learn of 
what the State is (and is not) doing in its name.177 Such information is the 
cornerstone of an informed and responsible citizenry. 
One might be inclined to view the public as merely an incidental beneficiary 
of defendants’ right to public trial.178 But such an understanding is difficult to 
reconcile with express language in Court opinions suggesting that the “right” 
protects interests that do not belong to the defendant.179 The Court has 
understood the Sixth and First Amendments to protect coextensive interests by 
requiring open courts.180 And the Court has understood the media to directly act 
                                                                                                                     
 171 See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2184–87 (2014) (discussing how criminal court audiences are largely 
composed of supporters of defendants, victims, and witnesses). 
 172 See id. at 2186 (noting the significant effect criminal cases have on audience 
members, both individually and communally). 
 173 See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1979) (noting that the right 
to a public trial is guaranteed to the defendant, not the public). 
 174 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984). 
 175 Id. at 47. 
 176 See id. at 46 (“[A] public trial encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages 
perjury.”). 
 177 See Simonson, supra note 171, at 2182 (discussing audience members’ democratic 
power to act on information they learn while observing court proceedings). 
 178 The Sixth Amendment does not confer a direct right on members of the public to be 
present for court. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 379–80. 
 179 See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017) (“The public-trial right 
also protects some interests that do not belong to the defendant.”); Waller, 467 U.S. at 45–
46 (noting that the press and public have a qualified right to attend court proceedings). 
 180 See Waller, 467 U.S. at 45–46 (“[T]he explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused 
is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and 
public.”). 
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in the public’s interest when it exercises its First Amendment right to open 
courts.181 If left to the First Amendment alone, there would be few occasions to 
vindicate the public’s interest in open trials. The press will only bring challenges 
in high profile case that are newsworthy. For all other cases, the vast majority, 
there is only the Sixth Amendment. 
If the right to public trial belonged exclusively to defendants, that right 
would presumably be theirs to waive as is typically true with other criminal 
procedure rights.182 But that is not the case.183 Defendants’ right to waive public 
trial and close the courtroom is limited. Defendants are sometimes interested in 
waiving the right to open court in order to exclude hostile members of the 
public.184 A defendant’s detractors may be even more interested in an open trial 
than the defendant’s supporters (if any). Detractors may amplify a defendant’s 
humiliation, make conviction more likely, or punishment harsher.185 The 
detractors may be members of the victim’s community or family, or just 
fascinated by a crime’s sordid facts. The Court has stated that “although a 
defendant can . . . waive his constitutional right to a public trial, he has no 
absolute right to compel a private trial.”186 Where the public’s fascination with 
a case threatens to overwhelm fairness to the defendant, its rights to access must 
be balanced against due process, fair-trial values.187 That balancing is carried 
out by the judge who is obliged to weigh the public’s countervailing interest.188 
2. Speedy Trial 
As with the right to public trial, the “right” to a “speedy trial” describes a 
process value that often inures to the public’s benefit and can be at odds with 
                                                                                                                     
 181 See Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating 
Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
921, 944–48 (2009) (summarizing cases). 
 182 Waiving the Miranda right to counsel, for example, means that the police will 
interrogate without counsel. But cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1965) (“The 
ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon 
the opposite of that right.”). 
 183 See id. at 35 (“[Defendant] has no absolute right to compel a private trial . . . .”). 
 184 See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 677–78 
(1996) (noting that guilty defendants are generally less enthusiastic about public trials than 
innocent defendants). 
 185 See id. at 661 (noting that harm to the accused’s reputation is inherent in criminal 
prosecutions, even when the trial is speedy, public, and fair). 
 186 Singer, 380 U.S at 35. 
 187 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979) (noting that courts have a 
constitutional duty to safeguard defendants’ due process rights by minimizing harm from 
“prejudicial pretrial publicity”). 
 188 See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 852 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that courts 
considering motions for private hearings must consider the public’s interest); United States 
v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790, 793–94 (W.D. Penn. 1967) 
(noting that courts weigh the public’s interest in an open proceeding against the interests of 
the defendant as a matter of “judicial discretion”). 
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defendants’ interests.189 When the latter is true, the defendants’ waiver rights 
are similarly circumscribed.  
The Supreme Court has characterized speedy trial as “generically different” 
from other constitutional rights.190 “[T]here is a societal interest in providing a 
speedy trial which exists separate from, and at time in opposition to, the interest 
of the accused.”191 The public has an interest in seeing guilty defendants 
punished fairly, without extraneous opportunities to commit more crimes (while 
waiting for trial, and avoiding the costs associated with pre-trial detention).192 
This interest sometimes aligns with a defendant’s interest in avoiding the 
psychic and physical (if detained) toll of living under the shadow of 
accusation.193 Delay may also hamper a defendant’s ability to stage an effective 
defense should evidence grow stale or disappear.194  
But a defendant may also have an interest in delaying proceedings where, 
for example, she is out on bail and where delay threatens to undermine the 
State’s case.195  
The law reconciles these tensions by permitting speedy trial challenges 
where the defendant’s interests align with the public’s interests. The public has 
an interest in courts functioning efficiently,196 but so too does it have an interest 
in culpable defendants being punished.197 In Barker v. Wingo, the Court devised 
four factors for evaluating speedy trial claims. The Barker factors include: the 
length of delay, the reason for the delay, whether the defendant objected to the 
delay, and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay.198 The factors 
allow courts to ensure that a defendant’s interests are sufficiently aligned with 
the public’s interest.199 A defendant who satisfies the factors will have endured 
a harm herself and also represent the public’s interest in an expeditious criminal 
justice system. The Court has noted the State’s deliberate use of the delay to 
                                                                                                                     
 189 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–20 (1972) (noting that the societal interest 
in a speedy trial is often in opposition to the interests of the defendant). 
 190 Id. at 519. 
 191 Id.  
 192 See id. (noting that backlogged dockets provide criminal defendants the opportunity 
to “manipulate the system” and “commit other crimes”).  
 193 See id.  
 194 See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (“[I]f a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his 
ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.”). 
 195 See id. at 521 (emphasizing that a delayed trial does not per se prejudice the accused’s 
defense because witnesses for the prosecution may forget details or become unavailable). 
 196 Id. at 519. 
 197 See supra notes 137–44 and discussion. 
 198 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–32.  
 199 See United States v. Frye, 372 F.3d 729, 739 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that the 
Barker analysis requires consideration of “societal interests in general”). 
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harm the defendant is particularly offensive to the Sixth Amendment.200 But so 
too is negligence and clogged courts.201  
But what of the public interest where the prosecutor and defense agree to 
delay? Just as with the right to public trial, a defendant’s waiving the right does 
not authorize its opposite.202 Even where the State and defense agree, the court 
must still approve waiver. For example, in New York courts will not approve 
speedy trial waivers by plea, expressly noting the importance of protecting the 
public’s interests in expeditious case processing.203  
A speedy trial, perhaps more than the other rights discussed above, 
implicates the dysfunction of our resource-starved and overwhelmed criminal 
courts. Delay is an endemic feature of the criminal process in the United 
States.204 Professional norms in these spaces accept significant delays; judges 
are thus likely to approve delay where the parties have done so.205 Both 
defendants’ and the public’s speedy trial interests are likely under-protected in 
most places.206 Given that speedy trial is tied up with other significant 
institutional design features, it would seem ripe for legislative intervention.  
To the extent that has occurred, legislatures have generally entrenched the 
defendant’s representative role rather than devising alternate means to protect 
parties’ interests. Statutes typically prescribe specific bright-line cutoffs by 
which a defendant must receive a trial. For example, the Federal Speedy Trial 
Act provides that “the trial of a defendant . . . shall commence within seventy 
days.”207 The statute, however, contains numerous bases for tolling and 
                                                                                                                     
 200 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. 
 201 Id. Since Barker, the Court has set a high bar for speedy trial claims based on clogged 
courts and overwhelmed public defenders, see Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 85 (2009) 
(“[T]he [s]tate may bear responsibility if there is ‘a breakdown in the public defender 
system.’”), and has not rendered a decision that provides an example of what kind of facts 
would satisfy that standard, see Boyer v. Louisiana, 569 U.S. 238, 241–42 (2013) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (denying cert. in case raising issue).  
 202 See Amar, supra note 184, at 662 (noting that the Speedy Trial Clause does not 
contain a right to an unspeedy trial). 
 203 See People v. Callahan, 604 N.E.2d 108, 113 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that plea bargains 
cannot impair the defendant’s ability to appeal constitutional speedy trial claims, in part 
because doing so would compromise the public’s interest in speedy trials); Nancy Jean King, 
Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 
178–79 (1999) (discussing Callahan). This only applies to speedy trial issues litigated and 
lost before the plea was entered. See People v. Alexander, 970 N.E.2d 409, 420 (N.Y. 2012) 
(holding that pending writs and motions need not be decided following a defendant’s guilty 
plea). 
 204 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 222–24 (1992) 
(discussing the institutional and strategic reasons for delay in criminal proceedings). 
 205 See id. at 222 (noting that prosecutors and defense attorneys generally agree to a 
continuance whenever they are unable to resolve calendar differences). 
 206 King, supra note 203, at 179–80 (arguing that liberally allowing defendants to waive 
their right to a speedy trial does not advance defendants’ interests and reduces the public’s 
interest to a mere “bargaining chip”). 
 207 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2012). 
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extending that clock,208 and charges the defendant with the burden of moving 
for and proving a statutory speedy trial violation.209 
D. Not Harmless 
The defendant’s representative role offers a partial cipher for why the Court 
exempts juror discrimination, speedy trial, and public trial violations from 
“harmless error” review on appeal.210 Constitutional errors need not be reversed 
automatically if they “did not contribute to the” guilty verdict.211 The Court, 
however, has held that only trial errors are subject to such “harmless error” 
review while “structural errors” are not.212 A “structural error” is one “affecting 
the framework within which the trial proceeds” as opposed to one that occurs 
“in the trial process itself” such that it can be evaluated in light of all of the other 
evidence presented by the state.213 Discriminatory juror selection along with 
“speedy and public trial” rights have been treated as “structural.”214 Were they 
not, it would usually be impossible to demonstrate that most violations 
contributed to a guilty verdict.215 
The distinction between “trial” and “structural” errors is confusing for a 
number of reasons that commentators have documented.216 The Court has, for 
example, defined “structural errors” as ones whose effect on outcome are “hard 
to measure” or result in “fundamental unfairness” regardless of outcome.217 A 
fair cross-section violation is an example of the former and “failure to give a 
                                                                                                                     
 208 Id. § 3161(h). 
 209 Id. § 3162(a)(2). 
 210 Fourth Amendment suppression motions are subject to harmless error review. See 
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576 (1986) (noting that the “harmless-error” standard has been 
applied to many constitutional errors and citing Fourth Amendment cases). This makes sense 
since, unlike juror discrimination, speedy trial, and public trial, suppression always involves 
evidence bearing on the defendant’s guilt. 
 211 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
 212 See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (noting that structural 
errors “should not be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 213 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
 214 See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908, 1911 (noting that public trial violations are structural 
errors and successful claims of discriminatory jury selection receive automatic relief). The 
Supreme Court has not explicitly called Batson violation “structural,” but lower courts have. 
See, e.g., Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is well established 
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Cir. 1998) (holding that a Batson claim “is a structural error that is not subject to harmless 
error review”).  
 215 See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908 (“[A]n error has been deemed structural if the effects 
of the error are simply too hard to measure.”). These values are only loosely tied to the 
determination of guilt or innocence. See supra Parts III.A, C. 
 216 See Justin Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1791, 1809, 1809 n.103 (2017) (summarizing literature).  
 217 See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. 
46 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:1 
reasonable-doubt instruction” an example of the latter.218 That a constitutional 
violation’s effect on outcome is difficult to measure implies that it is important 
for reasons other than its impact on the outcome. Similarly, “fundamental 
fairness” implies that the right is important beyond its bearing on the result. The 
two expressions simply re-beg the question of why a particular right is 
important. 
The Court has acknowledged that some structural errors protect interests 
other than the reliability of a verdict.219 But the Court has not forthrightly 
explained why some constitutional interests are more important than others. The 
analysis in the preceding sections suggests the presence of third-party interests 
may be significant. Third-party interests will often have had little or no bearing 
on the question of defendant’s criminal culpability but depend on defendants to 
be vindicated.220 If defendants are to vindicate significant third-party interests, 
it makes little sense to limit that role to the trial court alone. Were defendants 
not to continue playing that role on appeal, it would effectively undermine their 
ability to play the role at all. If a constitutional violation were not reversible on 
appeal, then there would be little (or no) reason for lower courts to be vigilant 
about those violations. There is, in other words, little practical option but to treat 
as “structural” those rights implicating third-party interests that defendants are 
charged with litigating in a representative capacity. 
IV. THE REPRESENTATIVE DEFENDANT 
The discussion in Part II sought to destabilize our settled understandings of 
defendants’ role in our criminal justice systems. That, in turn, invites two 
questions: why have defendants been tasked with playing this role (against the 
grain of the public’s perception of a defendant’s role, no less) and is it 
normatively desirable to foist this role upon defendants as opposed to some 
other entity, if anyone at all?  
The answers to these two questions are first, representative defendants help 
overcome some of the same structural impediments to the vindication of public 
harms that representative plaintiffs do in the civil context. That account goes far 
in answering the second question. It is normatively desirable for defendants to 
play this role because there is no other actor available to adequately vindicate 
these harms. Criminal defendants are also demographically representative of 
those in poor, minority communities that bear the punitive brunt of American 
criminal justice policy. 
                                                                                                                     
 218 See id. at 1911 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986); Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). 
 219 See id. at 1908 (noting that one such example is the interest in allowing defendants 
to decide for themselves how best to protect their liberty). 
 220 See id. at 1910 (noting that the right to a public trial protects some third-party 
interests unrelated to protecting defendants from unjust conviction). 
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A. Representative Plaintiffs and Representative Defendants 
Law scholars have spilt considerable ink exploring questions related to 
representative plaintiffs but have by and large overlooked the question of 
representative defendants. This is both because of the civil-criminal divide,221 
and the structural differences between the remedies that representative plaintiffs 
and defendants may seek. Nonetheless, as Daniel Meltzer’s singular treatment 
suggests, analyzing the parallels can be revealing.222  
Courts and commentators have noted that representative actions by 
plaintiffs help overcome structural impediments that prevent individual 
plaintiffs or the government from vindicating significant harms. The 
impediments include information deficits, political capture, lack of 
regulatory/political will, and collective action challenges.223 In the civil context, 
there are various representative devices for overcoming these impediments. 
Rules permitting class actions are one such procedural device.224 Civil rules 
allow a plaintiff to litigate on behalf of unnamed parties where many individuals 
have suffered similar injuries inflicted by a defendant.225 The representative 
plaintiff’s injury must typify those suffered by the group at large and implicate 
legal and factual questions common to the group.226 The representative plaintiff, 
if successful, is usually afforded some compensation in excess of that required 
for make-whole relief.227 The extra sum is intended to compensate for initiating 
the suit and seeing it through.228 
Permitting a representative plaintiff to litigate on behalf of unnamed third 
parties, at least in theory, solves the related problems of low-value harms and 
collective action problems. Where an individual’s injury generates loss that is 
less than the anticipated cost of the injury, the rational plaintiff will not bring an 
individual suit.229 Permitting claim aggregation creates incentives for individual 
plaintiffs who have sustained such injuries to identify one another and 
coordinate.230 Allowing such plaintiffs to proceed as a group also promotes 
                                                                                                                     
 221 See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 159, at 683, 688 (noting that although the civil 
and criminal bars are largely separate today, this was not always the case). 
 222 Meltzer, supra note 9, at 295, 328 (discussing the role of civil plaintiffs and criminal 
defendants in obtaining deterrent remedies). 
 223 See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1149–50, 1153–58 (2012) (discussing how the 
above factors have limited the ability of regulatory agencies to redress private harms). 
 224 See Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives 
from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 356 (1988). 
 225 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (governing class actions). 
 226 See id. at 23(a). 
 227 See JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:28 (16th ed. 
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incentive award payable from the class recovery” for class representatives).  
 228 See id. 
 229 See id. §1:1.  
 230 See id. 
48 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:1 
judicial efficiency by saving courts from having to decide claims on a piecemeal 
basis.231 
Congress may also empower plaintiffs to enjoin unlawful conduct on behalf 
of themselves and the general public without having sustained direct harm.232 
A “private attorney general” model is commonly included in civil rights and 
environmental legislation, among others.233 It is supposed to incentivize cause-
oriented and profit-oriented plaintiffs to bring suits that serve the public 
interest.234 Such schemes typically award plaintiffs (and, perhaps more 
importantly, plaintiffs’ counsel) financial benefit for having successfully 
litigated a case—for example, fee-shifting statutes compel a defendant to pay 
plaintiffs’ attorney fees.235 The private attorney general model is supposed to 
harness the initiative of private individuals and attorneys to supplement or 
wholly substitute for enforcement action by executive agencies.236 This function 
is particularly important where no agency exists, and where one does exist but 
is disinclined to engage in enforcement action because of capture or some other 
reason.237  
Qui tam actions, where a private “whistleblower” litigates on behalf of the 
government,238 present a final example. The plaintiff/whistleblower is awarded 
a bounty:239 a portion of the damages the government is entitled to recover 
following successful litigation.240 For example, a common case pattern involves 
a former employee of a government contractor blowing the whistle on her 
employer for having cheated the government.241 The Federal Claims Act’s qui 
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tam provision creates an incentive for the employee to use her insider 
knowledge to rectify the wrong perpetrated against the government.242 
The policy rationales for authorizing plaintiffs to represent the public 
interest in civil cases helps elucidate why defendants are tasked with that role in 
criminal cases. First, defendants and their counsel possess information about the 
criminal justice system’s operation that members of the public may not be able 
to readily obtain, even when directly harmed by the State’s conduct. For 
example, prospective jurors excluded on the basis of race or gender may not 
realize that fact.243 Even with peremptory challenges, excluded jurors may not 
fully understand why they were excluded. Even if jurors have some intuition 
that they were discriminated against, excluded jurors may not themselves 
observe the pattern of exclusion that evinces discriminatory intent.244  
Similarly, absent an arrest and prosecution, individuals whose Fourth 
Amendment rights have been violated have no easy way of discovering the 
violation.245 The victim may leave the encounter with an intuition that her rights 
were violated, but it may be difficult to say with certainty. For example, the 
Fourth Amendment authorizes probabilistic judgment on the part of police—the 
fact that no evidence of crime was discovered (or no arrest made) does not 
necessarily mean that the police violated the Fourth Amendment.246 Police are 
constitutionally entitled to conduct a search or seizure provided that they have 
an appropriate quantum of suspicion.247 An officer could have sufficient 
information to satisfy the constitutional standard of suspicion but be wrong as 
to the ultimate question of whether the targeted individual actually possessed 
evidence of a crime.248  
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Nor must the police articulate the constitutional basis for the stop to the 
target contemporaneously with its execution.249 The target, like an excluded 
juror, may have an intuition that her rights were violated, but have little 
opportunity to validate the intuition. Officers themselves may not commit to 
specific Fourth Amendment rationale for the stop and search until well after it 
occurs, if ever.250 Officers will assert a rationale when crafting a narrative 
account of the encounter in an arrest report, but in the absence of an arrest, such 
a report may never be created.  
For most speedy trial violations and many public trial violations, it may be 
difficult to identify third party beneficiaries specifically. The harm may be 
diffuse. The public has a general interest in the expeditious processing of 
criminal cases, but delays in any specific case will only compromise that interest 
on the margins—no one without a tie to the case will be any wiser for the 
delay.251 The same is true for violations of Sixth Amendment public trial. For 
those who have no tie to a case, but only an informational interest in learning 
what is going on in criminal courts generally, they will be no wiser for the public 
trial violation in a specific case.252 
The second reason why representative defendants are analogous to 
representative plaintiffs is that both make up for the absence of incentives for 
individuals to bring civil suits. Even when members of the public are aware that 
their constitutional rights have been violated, there are prohibitive logistical, 
legal, and financial barriers to challenging the violations. The Supreme Court 
noted in Powers v. Ohio: “Potential jurors . . . have no opportunity to be heard 
at the time of their exclusion. Nor can [they] easily obtain declaratory or 
injunctive relief when discrimination occurs . . . .”253 The excluded juror’s 
“small financial stake” will not justify the high costs of litigating a violation.254 
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The same financial impediments will exist for most Fourth Amendment and 
public trial violations. The financial loss associated with a brief, 
unconstitutional street or traffic stop is relatively low in comparison to 
prospective litigation costs.255 Even where an individual is confident that she 
was the victim of a Fourth Amendment violation, civil litigation is unlikely 
because it is cost prohibitive.256 The material harm is typically modest, the odds 
of recovery uncertain, and the costs of litigation high. Most Fourth Amendment 
violations on the street entail a relatively brief stop or a privacy intrusion that 
does not significantly harm the target.257 The odds against winning will also be 
high absent egregious facts that are easily corroborated.258 In civil suits, officers 
enjoy qualified immunity, meaning that they can only be held liable for 
violations of constitutional rules that were clearly established at the time of the 
violation.259 This coupled with the challenge of overcoming the officer’s factual 
account makes recovery challenging in Fourth Amendment cases.260 All of this 
is to say, that the net present value of any given Fourth Amendment claim is 
likely low, making litigation an unattractive financial proposition. The same 
would be true for a defendant’s supporters (and detractors) who were excluded 
from a part of the criminal proceeding, if they were permitted to challenge the 
exclusion at all.261  
Obtaining forward-looking civil relief for Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations is also challenging because civil plaintiffs must 
demonstrate likelihood of a future injury of the same variety that they have 
sustained in the past.262 Injunctive relief against future discrimination against 
jurors or illegal searches and seizures requires that the plaintiffs show that it is 
likely that they personally will be subjected to such unlawful treatment again.263 
While similar policy rationales animate representative action by criminal 
defendants and civil plaintiffs, the remedy available to the former is very 
different than that available to the latter. Representative plaintiffs are permitted 
to seek damages on behalf of aggrieved third parties and forward looking 
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remedies designed to reshape policy making.264 When plaintiffs launch 
structural reform litigation, the point is to prompt large-scale change in an 
institution’s decision making and behavior.265 The remedies afforded 
representative plaintiffs reflect that purpose and can immerse courts in 
managing an institution’s decision making at a granular level.266 This has led 
some commentators to argue that these types of suits should be significantly 
curtailed or prohibited.267 In contrast, other commentators suggest we retool our 
descriptive account of courts, recognizing the extent to which they make policy, 
not just resolve discrete legal disputes.268  
In contrast to representative plaintiffs, representative defendants cannot 
obtain damages or injunctive relief. There are some instances where a third-
party beneficiary receives an immediate benefit as a result of a criminal 
defendant’s representative action. For example, where a defendant successfully 
challenges juror exclusion in the trial court or prevents a courtroom’s closure to 
the public, the third party realizes immediate relief. But it will often be true that 
it is only defendants who benefit directly. For example, where juror exclusion 
is vindicated on appeal, the defendant will receive a new trial, but the excluded 
juror will derive no immediate benefit.269 Similarly, if a defendant successfully 
excludes highly probative evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, she might avoid conviction. But there is no direct benefit to any 
third party who has suffered a similar enforcement tactic in the past. Nor is there 
any guarantee that police will refrain from engaging the same misconduct in the 
future.  
That criminal defendants’ actions generate deterrent effects presupposes 
that judicial decisions are internalized by prosecutors and police. Whether they 
actually do so is another question.270  
                                                                                                                     
 264 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role 
of the Plaintiff, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 167–68 (1997) (discussing the damages 
calculation in a case). 
 265 See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and 
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 637–40 (1982).  
 266 E.g., MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE 41 (1998) (describing prison reform litigation). 
 267 See id. at 2–3 (summarizing literature).  
 268 See id. at 3, 6. 
 269 E.g., William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Section Errors on Appeal, 38 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1392 (2001) (discussing the remedy for a jury selection error found on 
appeal). 
 270 See generally Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary 
Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 373–90 (reviewing limited empirical literature regarding the 
deterrent effects of Fourth Amendment exclusion); Gilad Edelman, Why Is It So Easy for 
Prosecutors to Strike Black Jurors?, NEW YORKER (June 5, 2015), https://www.new 
yorker.com/news/news-desk/why-is-it-so-easy-for-prosecutors-to-strike-black-jurors 
[https://perma.cc/RRU4-BK5D] (discussing the difficulty in uncovering racial bias in 
prosecutors’ juror strikes and the inadequacy of existing remedies). This should not be taken 
to mean that lasting deterrence is straightforwardly achieved through structural litigation 
either. See CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL 15 (2009) (discussing theories for 
2020] REPRESENTATIVE DEFENDANTS 53 
There is, in other words, a disconnection between the representative role 
defendants are asked to play and the remedy typically made available when they 
do so successfully. Whether that is a problem in need of solution depends on 
whether one views representative action by a defendant as normatively 
desirable. 
B. If Nothing Is the Next Best 
Relying on representative defendants may not be the ideal way to realize 
constitutional values, but the absence of regulatory capacity and political will 
makes ideal enforcement schemes quixotic. And again, literature regarding 
representative plaintiffs is suggestive. It suggests we should embrace 
representative defendants more enthusiastically because other regulatory 
options are unavailable or cost prohibitive. Defendants are also demographically 
representative of the communities most intensively impacted by criminal justice 
policy.271  
A litany of criticism has been leveled against representative plaintiffs. 
Critics argue that these suits reward opportunistic lawyers and fail to produce 
outcomes that legislatures contemplated.272 It is difficult to empirically 
substantiate these criticisms,273 but if there is any truth to them, one must 
wonder why Congress and state legislatures have authorized private actors to 
vindicate public norms. Sean Farhang has offered an account grounded in the 
political realities of our fragmented State.274  
Congress may seek to insulate its legislative choices from shifts in political 
winds that change future legislative and executive priorities.275 Perhaps more 
significantly, America’s political culture does not favor creating new 
administrative agencies.276 Thus, the most obvious alternative to private 
enforcement of public interests, government enforcement through a dedicated 
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bureaucracy, is often politically implausible.277 The costs of private 
enforcement must thus be evaluated in light of the actual, next-best option, 
which may be no enforcement at all.  
The biggest cost of relying on representative defendants is lost convictions. 
The Court has long lamented having to pay this cost for deterring constitutional 
violations.278 The Court’s ambivalence has morphed into outright hostility in 
recent decades.279 An increasingly conservative Supreme Court has emphasized 
that a criminal trial’s purpose is singular: to ascertain the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence.280 This undercuts the range of third-party interests discussed in Part 
II. In each of those contexts, defendants have been empowered to challenge their 
convictions for fear that the underlying constitutional value will go unprotected 
otherwise.281  
It is difficult to imagine alternative regulatory institutions arising to 
vindicate the constitutional values described in Part II. Debate regarding 
alternative institutions has been most pitched regarding police regulation. Some 
commentators argue that more readily accessible civil relief would more 
effectively deter police than exclusion does.282 Others have argued that more 
intensive administrative regulation, whether internal police-managed or external 
civilian-managed, would be more effective than the exclusionary rule.283 There 
appears to be little appetite in any legislature for making civil relief against the 
police for Fourth Amendment violations more readily available. Despite 
considerable experimentation with civilian review of police, there is little to 
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suggest it has resulted in appreciable deterrence of constitutional (or other) 
violations.284 And the police themselves have also proven resistant to self-
regulation, at least around searches and seizures that do not implicate excessive 
force questions.285 The pervasiveness and strength of police unions also dim the 
prospect of more vigorous legislative and regulatory approaches materializing 
anytime soon.286  
With juror discrimination, open trials, and speedy trials, the constitutional 
norms directly implicate the work of courts. It is hard to imagine an institution 
outside the courts playing a regulatory role. Courts depend upon the parties that 
appear before them to raise issues. The public’s underlying interests in these 
constitutional values will be best protected if all the parties before the court have 
significant incentives to raise these issues. For criminal defendants to have 
incentive to do so, tethering the constitutional norm to the possibility of avoiding 
conviction is the most obvious carrot. While there is undoubtedly a social cost 
here, it may not be as dramatic as the Court has often suggested.287 Most 
criminal cases are not grisly, headline grabbers. For low-level narcotics crimes, 
property crimes, and so on, a lost conviction is not such a terrible cost to bear. 
Indeed, criminal court judges may view such cases as fungible and be prepared 
to dismiss for all manner of reasons unrelated to innocence, not least of which 
is simply clearing their dockets.288 
There is a deep moralistic undercurrent to the Supreme Court’s skepticism 
of defendants representing third-party interests in criminal cases. In its view, 
allowing a defendant to avoid conviction for a reason other than acquittal is a 
“windfall.”289 This is to take the defendant as morally undeserving simply by 
virtue of having been accused. This assumption does not sit comfortably with 
due process notions of innocent until proven guilty.  
The view that criminal defendants are unrepresentative is also 
sociologically out of step with the experience of millions of people. Poor men 
of color are more likely to have been criminal defendants at some point in their 
lives. A recent study concluded that, as of 2010, nearly one-third of all adult 
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male African Americans had a felony conviction.290 That means that the 
proportion who had at some point been a criminal defendant in their lives is 
even higher if one includes both felonies and misdemeanors.291 The majority of 
criminal defendants—some 80%—are poor.292 Extrapolating from these 
demographic realities suggests that in many poor, minority communities the 
experience of having been a criminal defendant is broadly representative of at 
least male experience.293 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
Parts II and III have presented an argument for recognizing the defendant’s 
representative role without ambivalence. If courts, commentators, defense 
attorneys, and, most importantly, the public were to do so, that could help make 
for more balanced criminal justice policy. Greater enthusiasm for representative 
defendants might also prompt policy changes that enable defendants and their 
attorneys to better effect that role in response to the third-party harms that 
regularly arise in criminal courts. 
A. Balancing the Public’s Perception of Criminal Justice 
Greater awareness of defendants’ representative role might prompt the 
public to view defendants as an extension of “the people” rather than as 
antagonistic to them. This in turn could help temper the harshness that has 
defined American criminal justice.294 That harshness has been driven in part by 
two generations worth of political rhetoric that equate “the people” with 
victimhood.295 The current political moment is fertile for reframing criminal 
defendants and criminal justice more generally. The decreased salience of crime 
in Americans’ perceptions of social problems might make them receptive to 
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rethinking where “the people” sit in a criminal courtroom.296 Eroding the 
public’s reflexive association with victims and the State’s prosecutorial function 
would make the ground even more fertile than it already is for criminal justice 
reform.297  
The representative defendant is a corrective to the victim-centered 
conception of criminal justice that took hold in the late-twentieth century. That 
shift had begun to take clear shape by the late 1960s,298 and congealed in 
response to the increased salience of crime in American politics.299 As historians 
and criminologists have documented, those perceptions were a function of not 
only increased crime rates,300 but broad social and economic dislocations.301 
De-industrialization, increased physical mobility, foreign wars, and the civil 
rights movement had destabilized America’s post-war social order.302 Many 
white voters’ anxiety found expression in the language of crime control.303 
President Johnson’s declaration of “war on crime” was a direct response to these 
anxieties.304 His war on crime quickly collapsed into the thinly racialized “law 
and order” platform that had emerged on the political right in the 1960s and 
gained deep traction with President Nixon’s election in 1968.305 In the decades 
to follow, being tough on crime became a rhetorical cornerstone of American 
politics.306  
Embedded in the law and order platform was a critique of criminal justice 
actors as overly committed to an ineffective rehabilitative ideal that rewarded 
offenders with undeserved leniency.307 Related was a transparency critique: 
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leniency was the product of an opaque and clubby culture among criminal 
justice professionals.308 A host of reforms were advanced with a strong and 
steady drift toward greater harshness. Mandatory minimum sentences, the 
expansion of narcotics offenses, and increased funding for police and 
prosecutors were hallmarks of tough on crime politics.309 The notion of 
“victims’ rights” dovetailed readily with this policy agenda.310 
The victims’ rights movement arose in the late 1970s as part of America’s 
shift towards harsher criminal justice policy.311 Victims’ rights advocates 
sought to make the criminal justice process more responsive to victims’ 
interests.312 These advocates viewed prosecutors as the best positioned and most 
amenable to advancing their cause.313 The impetus for the victims’ rights 
movement came from the perception that criminal justice traded victims’ 
interest in favor of bureaucratic expediency which worked to the advantage of 
defendants.314 The movement spawned a host of legal and policy innovations 
that reshaped the practice of criminal justice.315 The right to make victim impact 
statements during sentencing, the creation of public victim compensation funds, 
and the creation of victim outreach professionals in prosecutors’ offices are all 
examples of victims’ rights reforms.316  
More than any policy reform however, the victims’ rights movement created 
a victimological zeitgeist that came to define how the public viewed itself. The 
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figure of the victim came to typify the vulnerability of the average citizen,317 
with the prosecutor and police cast as their representatives.318 
Jonathan Simon has argued that this broad, public identification with 
victims accounts for how the American State has “govern[ed] through 
crime.”319 By stoking public fear of crime, the State “nudges out other kinds of 
opportunities” to frame public policy dilemmas in nonpunitive terms.320 Over 
generations, the public has come to view a host of social problems in criminal 
justice terms rather than social welfare, public health, or other terms.321 In this 
paradigm, not only does criminal justice grow harsher, its vocabulary comes to 
dominate how the public conceptualizes a range of others, most of whom are 
poor and minority.322 Defendants come to stand in as the antithesis of the 
people.323 
An account of the representative defendant is a partial corrective for our 
criminal justice system’s victim-sided tilt. A victim-centered view of criminal 
justice cannot adequately reflect criminal justice’s complexity or the plurality 
of values it serves. As described in Part II, our criminal justice system reflects 
and reproduces a range of values, many of which have little to do with accurately 
determining guilt or vindicating harm suffered by a specific victim. Defendants 
serve an important public function by staving off the State when it is abusively 
coercive, systematically exclusionary, or just irrational. The defendant should 
accordingly be viewed as more than just an object of pity or contempt, but rather 
as a part of the public itself and doing work that is often in its service. By 
extension, defense counsel should also be imagined as agents of public justice. 
They are, of course, critical to defendants’ ability to effectively execute their 
representative role. 
B. Enabling the Representative Defendant 
The Supreme Court has pinched its nostrils and permitted defendants to act 
in a representative capacity. Part III above put forth a case for the Court and 
everyone else un-pinching their nostrils and equipping defendants to more 
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transparently and vigorously effect their representative role. Effectively 
executing the defendant’s representative role has implications for how defense 
counsel is funded and the availability of procedural tools to enable that role. 
Such changes may in turn prod deeper thinking about the kinds of systemic 
harms defendants and their counsel should be empowered to challenge in 
criminal courts. 
The following discussion identifies a tentative list of policy and legal 
reforms that would enable defendants to more effectively perform their 
representative role. 
Claim Aggregation. Many of the same kinds of informational/incentive 
deficits and structural impediments that account for representative plaintiffs in 
the civil context account for the representative defendant in the defense 
context.324 The analogy supports making homologous tools like claim 
aggregation available to the latter. We tend to reductively conceptualize the 
criminal process as narrowly individualistic, but there is some precedent for 
claim aggregation in the criminal context.325 Brandon Garrett has described the 
use of aggregation techniques in the context of right to counsel claims and 
challenges to forensic evidence, among others.326 While procedural rules 
governing aggregation are underdeveloped in the criminal context, that need not 
be true.327 Of course due process would require different constraints on 
aggregation in the criminal cases in comparison to civil cases. For example, 
Garrett has noted the importance of bifurcation—only those issues that are 
actually shared between cases ought to be subject to aggregation.328 
Fourth Amendment suppression in particular lends to aggregation. Given 
that the remedy of exclusion is designed to further deterrence alone, patterns of 
unconstitutional search and seizure raise particularly urgent concern.329 When 
such a practice presents itself in multiple cases, aggregation (for the purposes of 
suppression alone), would allow for a more thorough and efficient consideration 
of the constitutional claims.330 Aggregation would allow the parties to construct 
a more meticulous portrait of police practices and their impact. This would in 
turn allow courts to make more informed inferences regarding those practices’ 
third-party impacts.  
The deterrent effect of a group-based suppression remedy is also likely to 
be higher than in an individual case.331 Suppression is supposed to deter through 
pedagogical effect; the more dramatic the suppression hearing and its effect, the 
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greater the likelihood that police will learn of it and internalize its lesson.332 As 
I have discussed at length elsewhere, what constitutes a “pattern” of police 
misconduct may be different in the criminal context than it would be in civil 
context and procedural rules ought to reflect those differences.333 
Representative action in each of the contexts discussed in Part II may be 
amenable to aggregation.  
Challenging Other Systemic Harms. A more robust conception of the 
representative defendant may support the creation of more robust remedies for 
constitutional harms in the criminal process.  
For example, the Supreme Court has hinted that dismissal might not be an 
appropriate remedy for a selective enforcement claim brought under the 
Fourteenth Amendment in a criminal case.334 Defendants who bring selective 
enforcement or prosecution claims contend that they would never have been 
subject to criminal prosecution were it not for the prosecutor’s or police’s 
racially discriminatory exercise of discretion.335 The Court is generally loathe 
to “suppress” the person—in that vein, the Court has held that the Due Process 
Clause does not compel such a remedy where an individual’s presence in court 
was brought about unconstitutionally.336 But equal protection claims implicate 
unique third-party interests and thus warrant that defendants receive a dismissal 
remedy. 
When a criminal defendant brings an equal protection challenge by virtue 
of her membership in a protected group, the practice typically inures to the 
disadvantage of the protected group. First, the challenged practice heaps 
additional stigma on group members by virtue of their membership. In Batson, 
the Court noted that “[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selection extends 
beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire 
community.”337 Similarly, selective enforcement based on race reproduces 
stereotypical notions of black (or other minority) criminality that stigmatizes the 
larger group.338 But community members would not have standing to challenge 
the selective enforcement without themselves having been enforced against. Nor 
are those engaged in criminal misconduct likely to reveal themselves in order to 
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seek injunctive relief.339 Any deterrent effect must be achieved through 
litigation in criminal cases. Dismissal should be the remedy. 
Systemic Data and Discovery. Effectively bringing systemic challenges in 
criminal cases requires the availability of data regarding systemic practices. 
With proper incentives,340 defense counsel may be more diligent in gathering 
information regarding police, prosecutor, and court practices that harm 
defendants as a class and the public. For example, defenders might be able to 
identify patterns of Fourth Amendment violations by recording and cross-
referencing clients’ accounts of stops over time. Defenders might also, over 
time, track prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges in different cases along 
with the overall demographic profile of jury venires. A defender agency that 
took defendants’ representative role seriously would, in fact, track all 
information available to it that might give rise to constitutional, or any other 
systemic, claims.  
If defense counsel were to pursue its representative role more aggressively, 
this could help create incentives for prosecutors and courts to collect systemic 
data more meticulously. The Constitution, of course, requires prosecutors to 
produce any evidence that is materially exculpatory.341 It is undecided whether 
that obligation extends to evidence that is germane to Fourth Amendment 
suppression, but it may be.342 That obligation, however, does not extend to 
prosecutor and police enforcement and charging practices.343 Nor does it apply 
to information generated by courts themselves.344 To the extent that judicial 
practices such as selecting jury venires and closing courtrooms have 
constitutional significance, courts need not collect and analyze this information 
let alone disclose results to defense counsel in criminal cases. This disserves 
defendants and the third-party interests they represent. Courts should be more 
transparent with information regarding their own systemic practices, supplying 
it liberally to defense counsel and the public.  
Restricting Waiver. Waiver is an endemic feature of criminal justice 
practice. Defendants are routinely asked (or compelled) to waive rights in order 
to secure benefits of which a plea bargain is the most common example. In most 
jurisdictions, a plea bargain requires that defendant waive most rights, including 
those which have significant third party-benefits, like those discussed in Part 
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II.345 Allowing defendants and prosecutors to bargain those rights away may 
undermine third parties’ interest in seeing the issue litigated and resolved. 
Routinely forsaken speedy and public trial rights may contribute to a slow and 
opaque criminal justice system. Waived suppression claims forgo deterrence. 
And for pleas entered following jury selection, improperly excluded jurors’ 
interests will not be vindicated.  
Legislatures and courts could restrict defendants’ ability to waive such 
rights, effectively taking them off the table for plea bargains. New York has 
already done this in a limited way for speedy trial issues litigated before a 
plea.346 Some jurisdictions allow defendants to appeal Fourth Amendment 
suppression issues following a plea.347 Limiting waivers should not interfere 
with either defendants’ or prosecutors’ core incentives to plea bargain in most 
cases: defendants seek to avoid harsher post-trial punishment and prosecutors 
seek to avoid expending resources on trial practice.348 Limiting waiver of course 
supposes that defense counsel, who are ordinarily resource strapped, will follow 
through on litigating non-waivable constitutional issues. Additional incentives 
may be needed to get them to do so.  
Defender Funding. The suggestions above would have already-strapped 
public defenders take on additional advocacy responsibilities. That will require 
additional financial support for defenders. Public acceptance of the defendant’s 
representative role could help bolster arguments for that funding. In the civil 
context, specific financial incentives have been created to induce private 
attorneys to take up representative actions—fee shifting statutes and contingent 
fee arrangements are examples.349 There are, of course, no parallel 
arrangements for defense counsel. Many public defenders scarcely have the 
resources necessary to represent their individual clients, let alone to vindicate 
third-party interests.350 Specific resources could be made available to defenders 
who take up specified representative actions. But, in the main, public defenders 
should simply be funded adequately. 
The adequacy of states’ support for public defenders has been a persistent 
dilemma since the Supreme Court declared a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.351 Gideon v. Wainwright obliges states to fund public defense, but the 
Court has left it to states, which have taken very different approaches to 
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financing criminal defense.352 At one end of the spectrum, some states have 
created defender agencies while at the other, states have left it to private 
attorneys who are paid piecemeal by the case.353 The latter arrangement is 
widely regarded as the least effective. And that is doubly true for facilitating 
defendants’ representative role. The attorney who receives a fixed fee per 
case,354 regardless of outcome, has little incentive to do anything but the bare 
minimum.  
Financing for public defense depends substantially on political will. Courts 
have been reluctant to regulate the financing question, despite the availability of 
various constitutional grounds for doing so.355 And even if they were more 
willing to do so, it is unlikely that courts would compel states to fund the 
maximalist version of the defense function suggested here. Educating the public 
on the defendant’s representative role could help build increased public pressure 
to support more funding for defenders. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The conventional wisdom that defendants are parochial denies the public 
responsibilities that our Constitution invests in them. It also denies the extent to 
which being a defendant is demographically representative of those in poor and 
minority communities. Courts, commentators, and the public need not make 
heroes of criminal defendants, but all should be clear-eyed about the important 
role that criminal defendants play in our system. They are critical agents for 
upholding would-be jurors’ participation rights, regulating police search and 
seizure practices, and guaranteeing an open and expeditious criminal justice 
system. The structural and practical impediments that prevent members of the 
public from vindicating these interests themselves are analogous to those that 
animate private attorney generals in the civil context. Criminal defendants and 
their counsel are uniquely positioned to overcome these impediments. Rather 
than embarrassedly looking askance, we should create more coherent and 
effective incentives for defendants to energetically perform their representative 
roles. Doing so will improve both their lot and that of the third parties they so 
often represent. 
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